Gregory S. Jones, The Iran Nuclear Deal One Year Later, Constraints on Iran’s Nuclear Program Have Eroded Significantly,” January 17, 2017.  The Iran Nuclear Deal’s restrictions on Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing capabilities have eroded significantly.  Iran has twice violated the restriction on the size of its heavy water stockpile.  The Deal has cut off access to critical information on almost all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, making it impossible to determine whether Iran’s current breakout time meets the Deal’s one year goal.  To read a pdf of the full paper click here 

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Gregory S. Jones, “Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Reactor: A Potential Source of Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons,” March 24, 2016.  The nuclear deal with Iran virtually ignored Iran’s Bushehr reactor even though it produces about 240 kilograms of plutonium per year.  The first discharge fuel from the reactor contained 92 kilograms of fuel-grade plutonium which can be used to produce powerful nuclear weapons.  The Iran nuclear deal contains no requirement that this plutonium be exported.  By withdrawing fuel early from this reactor for purported safety reasons, Iran can produce additional quantities of fuel-grade or even weapons-grade plutonium whenever it wants.  Policy makers need to take a more realistic view of the proliferation dangers of reactors such as Bushehr.  To read a pdf of the full paper click here

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Gregory S. Jones, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: The End of Nonproliferation?,” November 2, 2015.  Enrichment and reprocessing are the key technologies required to produce the nuclear material for nuclear weapons.  Given that the Iran nuclear deal grants Iran the right to possess unrestricted enrichment and reprocessing in the long-term, it is going to be difficult for the U.S. to pursue a coherent nonproliferation policy. To read a pdf of the full paper click here

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Gregory S. Jones, “Distorting Intelligence to Sell the Iran Nuclear Deal,” October 8, 2015.  To try to justify the Iran nuclear deal the Obama Administration has completely reversed its estimate of when the Iran nuclear program, absent the deal, might be able to produce a nuclear weapon.  That the Administration has felt it necessary to do so highlights the weakness of the deal, which buys little at the expense of seriously damaging overall U.S. nonproliferation policy.  To read a pdf of the full paper click here

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Gregory S. Jones, “The Arak Reactor and the Iran Nuclear Deal’s Prohibition on the Production of Weapons-Grade Plutonium,” September 3, 2015.  One of the more puzzling terms of the JCPOA requires the Arak reactor “not to produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation.”  Since the U.S. revealed almost forty years ago that even reactor-grade plutonium, let alone the fuel-grade plutonium that will be produced by the Arak reactor, can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons this constraint has little significance with respect to Iran’s capability to develop a nuclear weapon.  However, President Obama has been seriously misinformed and has incorrectly stated that only weapons-grade plutonium can be used to produce nuclear weapons.  The President’s erroneous statements should be corrected since they threaten to undermine broader U.S. nonproliferation policy to restrict plutonium stockpiles in non-nuclear weapon countries.  Regarding the Iran nuclear deal itself, since the Arak reactor will be permitted to produce significant quantities of fuel-grade plutonium, the Administration should admit that the deal does not block Iran’s plutonium pathway to a nuclear weapon.  To read a pdf of the paper click here

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Gregory S. Jones, “An Iran Nuclear Deal That Spreads Nuclear Weapons,” August 10, 2015.  The original goal of a nuclear deal with Iran was to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.  This summer President Obama has claimed the deal does just that.  However, most analysts agree that the current deal is simply a short-term delaying tactic—a view held by President Obama himself just last April.  My analysis finds that the deal does little to delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons compared to the case where there is no deal.  What is worse, the deal eases Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon by removing the sanctions that have considerably increased the costs of Iran’s nuclear weapon program.  Additionally, the deal, by legitimizing centrifuge enrichment, heavy water production and the Arak reactor, greatly undermines U.S. nonproliferation policy, increasing the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.  Congress should reject the Iran nuclear deal. To read a pdf of the full paper click here

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Gregory S. Jones, September 28, 2014, "Ensuring the Iran Negotiations Do Not Promote the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." As the nuclear negotiations with Iran continue past the July 20, 2014 deadline, it is necessary for the P5+1 to adopt a negotiating position that does not legitimize centrifuge enrichment for any country that wants this technology.  Otherwise, Iran and other countries will have easy access to the nuclear material required to produce nuclear weapons.  To read a pdf of the full paper click here